Name: *** Rank: *** Unit: *** Place of incident: *** Description:
What was the purpose of this campaign, incidentally? What were you told?
That we're going in to create appropriate conditions for the negotiation to bring Gilad Shalit home, this came up. We were told we were going in to enable the residents of (Israel's) southern region to live in safety again, and to topple the Hamas regime… This whole campaign was about going in there and getting things back in order.
That was the official expression? How did your battalion-commander put it? Do you recall expressions such as "This is not the IDF I know"?
Yes. There was an attempted infiltration while we held the fence zone and replaced the auxiliary company. There was an attempt made and we were supposed to catch anyone infiltrating Israeli territory. We went in and were stopped by the company-commander's vehicle at the camp gate. He told us, "Guys, there's an infiltration, there are terrorists and we're going to screw them, we're going to fuck them to hell." I didn't expect to hear such language from my company-commander. I didn't expect him to express himself that way. Tell us, "There's an infiltration going on, we're going…" Even wiping out sounds to me a bit… These are expressions I hadn't heard.
Were there other cases that sounded wrong to you?
There was this paratrooper platoon-commander I heard talking in retrospect about an incident they had, "How we took them apart, trashed their house, didn't leave one stone in place." Okay, why did you do it, were they firing from that house? "No, not from that house, from nearby. We killed the terrorist and went in to trash the house."
And when you hear this, how do you react?
I turn around and leave. I don't like this stuff. Forget the fact that it's inhumane, it's unprofessional, that you're dealing with bullshit. Okay, you're a hell of a man, you've trashed a house. So? Just like those soldiers who slap Palestinians around at the checkpoint. He swore at you so you slapped him around, great. It's below us. An army that does these things, that takes apart houses because there was sporadic shooting nearby, is an unprofessional army. Really bullshitting around.
Name: *** Rank: *** Unit: *** Place of incident: *** Description:
You mentioned the atmosphere a lot. I'm trying to imagine this as a soldier and consider the commanding echelons. I wonder about a company commander and the officers. Say a soldier follows your company commander, his conduct, what kind of "follow me!" spirit gets across?
I ended up with two types. But after the incident with the Palestinian who was killed (the witness spoke about a shooting at a person moving around one of the soldiers' positions who, eventually, turned out to be an innocent passer-by), one thing that etched itself in my mind was that immediately after he was taken down I heard the company commander on radio saying, 'we opened the evening' or something in that vein. I can't tell you he was thirsting for blood, but he wasn't exactly interested in controlling what was happening. There was another type of commander which I'd like to mention, my deputy company commander who quarreled with the guys so they wouldn't sit on the sofas, stuff like that. He was an outstanding model.
What did people say to him?
People argued with him and later there was talk about this. They resented him and eventually we had a company discussion and they mentioned this specifically. He wouldn't let them break things in the house.
So what did they say about the company commander?
There was less talk of values, more of professionalism, not a moral issue. The difficult thing about the atmosphere was the negligible value placed on human life. People didn't seem to be to upset about taking human lives. For some of the guys this wasn't the first time, they had taken part in many army operations. I was upset at the talk I heard. Not the deeds I saw done. "Armed or not, incriminated or not – what difference does it make?" That's the impression I had from what I heard. It didn't surprise me, it was no shock because I had known these guys before, but unlike previous assignments we'd had, their finger was lighter on the trigger and that brings things out. It also transforms the discussion.
People let themselves go more?
Yes. The commanders, too, were more permissive. Unlike routine security assignments, this was a different kind of risk altogether. Again, with all the alerts we got there – either we were being lied to the whole time, or it was a miracle that we came out without significant casualties.
Name: *** Rank: *** Unit: *** Place of incident: *** Description:
The night the infantry went in we maneuvered in ***. We had to get to that base earlier, before dark – about half an hour to an hour earlier. We were at the rendezvous in ***, assembled in one of the assembly halls and the battalion commander held a speech for the whole battalion. He said it was not going to be simple. He defined the operation goals: 2000 dead terrorists, not just stopping the missiles launched at (Israeli) communities around the Gaza Strip. He claimed this would bring the Hamas down to its knees. This number would be a success for the army. As for rules of engagement, the army's working assumption was that the whole area would be devoid of civilians. As soon as the army would go in, from the north, since these are all open farming spaces until you get to Al Atatra, open spaces, there would no longer be people there, so as far as we were concerned anyone there is suspect and the working assumption was that no civilians would still be around. They would escape southbound into Gaza City. Anyone there, as far as the army was concerned, was to be killed.
Shoot to kill?
These words were not used, more like military expressions such as 'take him down.'
No one said 'kill innocents.' But the instruction was that for the army, anyone there is suspect and should be taken down.
Was there any mention of innocents? Do you recall such discourse?
Don't catch me at my word, but it was obvious, the battalion commander made it very clear that obviously if someone's innocent, they're not to be touched. Clearly the objective was to get terrorists, but I think that mainly panic was the rule of the game. Everyone was certain we were going to face massive fire as soon as we go into the Strip. The issue of civilians became irrelevant as soon as you'd enter combat – the rules change. You shoot. It's war. In war no questions are asked. In war those anti-tank missiles are blowing up people all around you – that's the situation that was anticipated there, and that's what defined the rules of engagement. In this story, civilians were less relevant.
Name: *** Rank: *** Unit: *** Place of incident: *** Description:
The battalion commander said there would be lots and lots of terrorists and we should really watch out but don't worry, everyone will have taken plenty of people down. At the briefing, I think it was the day we were about to go on to another mission, he was talking about our going into Gaza, and there will be plenty of terrorists for everyone.
Everyone was disappointed about not engaging anyone. You go crazy and are dying for something to happen already. Some soldiers from Sderot and the southern Israeli localities also want to take revenge (for the rocket shelling on their hometown) on terrorists. So the company commander said, "Don't worry, once we go in you'll have no space left on your rifle butt, you'll have to mark your X-s on your shirt sleeves…" When the battalion commander spoke, his personal message was that he was not willing for any of us to get hurt or risk himself because of suspects, and if there's need – we take down anyone. He would do everything in his power so that none of the soldiers would get hurt. This was the general attitude in the army: Go in with insane fire power because this is our only advantage over them.
And was there really such serious fire power?
There were rockets, Lau, whole containers of Negev machine-gun ammo flying around there, and I'm still talking to you just about the infantry, let alone combat helicopters and tanks and all that.
Where did all of this fly around?
Suspect places. There were plenty of launchers. You know you're going to enter a house and usually pretty sure it's either empty, or just terrorists inside. So you launch at all the windows, the walls, here and there a Matador. Tanks take down houses if they're not sure about them. One night they saw a terrorist and he disappeared so they decided he'd gone into a tunnel, so they brought a D-9 and razed the whole orchard.
Okay, I realize this is operational consideration and what can you do, even if it hurts to see it. No one spared ammunition or weapons.
…What about the tank taking down a house?
Sometimes you know the house is empty. You know as far as you can know. Now if the house disrupts your defense line, you take it down with a tank or a bulldozer. We took an eight-story house and the instruction was not to enter any doorway because it would be booby-trapped. That's what we have the Matador for, to take down a wall and enter through there. But the Matador proved itself somewhat less effective, so a tank shelled out a hole in the wall and that's how we got in.
What is a Matador?
It's a missile for urban warfare. It's very effective. But when we went in with it we didn't really use it so much. There were places where we fired at a house and then discovered there were people inside.
…Was there a notion of deterrent fire, show of presence?
Sure. Every other day we'd initiate a blast of fire. Not towards people. Just at windows which we'd observe for a while and know that the house is empty. No one would stay in houses close to the ones the IDF was staying in. They could live further away.
At what level were the fire blasts? Light arms? Tanks?
As for fire power, it was light arms and Negev machine-guns. Tanks fire only under instructions. There were cases where tanks were under the command of the company. There was also a case where a helicopter arrived and the company commander told him what to take down.
What happened there?
As we began the offensive, there was a house there close to the one we occupied, so we took it down. The grounds for this was operational, it was a house that had strategic advantage over the one we were sitting in. We saw no one there and there were no weapons inside but we took it down because it controlled our own position.
Name: *** Rank: *** Unit: *** Place of incident: *** Description:
I was a D-9 operator, and was called up for reserves duty on Saturday, January 3rd, I think, got there on January 4th.
Which is just when the ground-offensive began, right?
Yes.
So you arrive and get briefed, what were the briefings you had?
Yes. Standard things, signing forms for getting our weapons.
Getting outfitted, uniforms, gear, the works?
Yes. Target practice, a drill here, a drill there. The infantry really trained hard, but we had nothing to train with, there was no equipment. In short, what shocked me was a talk we had with the commander of ***, he's a colonel, and he gave our whole battalion a talk. The tone of it was really, first of all he started out with something like "Unfortunately we're a democracy, so we can't demolish Gaza to the extent that we'd really like." Perhaps he didn't actually say "unfortunately," but he repeated, twice, that "the fact that we're a democracy works against us, for the army cannot act as aggressively as it would like." Then he said once again that we're going into this operation aggressively, without… Usually in such talks the army, the commanders mention the lives of civilians and showing consideration to civilians. Here he didn't even mention this. Just the brutality, go in there brutally.
Those are the words he used?
Yes. He said, "In case of any doubt, take down houses. You don't need confirmation for anything, if you want." Perhaps it's legitimate, but if you suspect the presence of an explosive charge, you should get confirmation for a tank to fire. In short, a tank would fire a shell on the basis of a suspected charge. This is perhaps legitimate, but he also said: "Fortunately the hospitals are full to capacity already, so people are dying more quickly." Then someone answered him, one of the soldiers replied cynically: "So kill the doctors." The commander replied dismissingly, not understanding his cynical intent, twice: "We're a democracy, we can't do things the way we would like to do them." He didn't leave any time for questions, either.
How did the guys react at this briefing? Many guys were not shocked. I was. Many were surprised, but he didn't leave any time for questions, if anyone wanted to ask about the civilian population. Because, again, he didn't even mention civilians.
You mean that normally civilians are talked about.
Yes. There was a discussion at the end of our term of duty, led by the brigade-commander, a colonel, who said that the army did show consideration. He did mention the civilians. But that was after it was all over.
Usually the issue of civilian population is brought up?
Yes.
As a D-9 operator, the issue of civilian population is nearly technical in your line because of your field of vision and the size of your equipment and all. In your regular service, is that something that is especially emphasized?
The D-9 operator is not the one who can show consideration to the civilian population. I mean, he can only do more damage than he already must, but he cannot show consideration. If he's ordered to "demolish a house," he demolishes a house. On the other hand, he could be the type of operator who became famous in (the army's invasion of) Jenin, who – when instructed to demolish a certain house – looked for the route that would inevitably demolish the largest number of houses on the way to the targeted house.
So commanding officers were sitting in on this talk?
Yes, the entire company, as well as the battalion-commander, company-commanders.
…They actually designated targets on the map? Yes.
You are usually assigned to a force on the ground; you are not directly subordinate to the Corps of Engineers. That's the usual order of things. We're assigned to other forces. But what we did, two tanks led an armored convoy, two D-9s led an armored convoy. What we did, our objective was to demolish houses. We were secured by heavy APCs and tanks. In this case the tanks were assigned to us rather than the other way around. There were five or six D-9s active on the ground all of the time. And heavy APCs and tanks that secured us.
So when did you actually go in?
If I'm not mistaken, the ground forces began to enter on Thursday.
This is after the infantry had been throughout this area?
Yes. The area was completely empty. Everything was empty.
Ghost town, not a soul in sight?
Yes.
So you go in, who commands the operation, this mission? Armored Corps, I guess.
So how did you get your orders? You sat with a location map?
First there was a briefing before entry, and then inside Gaza, and we got our instructions over radio.
You're simply told, "See that house on the left? Go for it"?
Yes.
You were doing mainly houses there?
Yes, houses, and agricultural areas as well, orchards and hothouses.
Those areas where you destroyed hothouses and fields, were there any explosive charges there? The battalion got two explosive charges as well as anti-tank missiles.
Against the D-9s?
Yes. And I think the main concern was that tunnels were being built from within those houses.
To abduct soldiers?
Yes.
So why demolish one house and not the other, because of intelligence on the tunnel? Yes, intelligence information.
And in the agricultural areas, do you recall explosive charges against you? Yes.
How much was actually demolished there? Anything the likes of which you had seen as a regular soldier?
This was rare. Usually house demolition is not something you do a lot. If I remember correctly, from the battalion-commander's talk at the end, he said "We demolished 900 houses." This might not be absolutely precise, but it was a really huge number. We demolished a lot. There were people who had been in Gaza for two days constantly demolishing one house after the other, and we're talking about a whole battalion, so it could be. There were a lot of houses, that's for sure. The battalion was activated both in the north and in the south, but only adjacent to the fence.
In your briefing you were told you would be clearing explosive charges because infantry would be following you?
No.
Did anyone come in after you? No.
So in fact you were the closing force. The area had already been 'cleansed.' Infantry had already been there, was already inside. Yes.
You guys come to deal with all the areas where intelligence reports tunnels and such.
Yes, or houses that were used to shoot out of, stuff like that.
And when you wrap things up, you were there at the end?
By the time the operation ended we had been inside for three weeks. The first week there were briefings, the second week mostly operations, and the third week was already under ceasefire, but we were still going in, this time closer to the fence and not demolishing houses, just orchards and stuff like that. Only things that interfere with ground conditions. We'd level the ground near the fence to expand visibility from Israel.
How far from the fence?
200 meters. I didn't go in at that point, but it was 200 meters.
Name: *** Rank: *** Unit: *** Place of incident: *** Description:
He (the battalion commander) also spoke about having to remain alert and not be afraid, he stressed that this was not a limited confrontation such as in Hebron, and not to hesitate to shoot if we suspect someone, nor feel bad about destruction because it is all done for the safety of our own soldiers.
But you had light arms, you were not in tanks. And destruction, I mean how much of that could you inflict?
It was a combined operation. There's a D-9 bulldozer and 'Matador' (missile) that can perforate a building. He said that whatever was destroyed can be rebuilt, but the life of a soldier once killed cannot be restored.
Did he make any distinction between civilians and terrorists?
That, too, was mentioned later, not at the same talk, that if we see something suspect and shoot, better hit an innocent than hesitate to target an enemy. You exercise judgment. The first house we entered contained not a single enemy. We fired at windows and fire was not returned. So we went in and opened it the way we usually go at a house in Hebron: we go in, call out to the owner to open, gather all the males, shackle them, gather the entire family in one room and begin to search the house. This is not something that is usually done in war.
When you entered a house, did you know what you were supposed to do differently from other areas in the West Bank? How is this different?
When you enter a house, the idea is that it contains an enemy. You're supposed to shoot your way in. We didn't do this in the first house because we had opened fire and no fire was returned. So we assumed there was no one there. Then we knocked on the door and told them to call everyone downstairs, gathered them in a room and combed the place securely, looking for incriminating materials: weapons, posters, propaganda stuff.
Whom did you find in the house?
Men, women and children. This was our first objective in the operation plan. We walked in, reached the neighborhood and began the offensive advance. While you're attacking you shoot a lot even while encountering no one. You make sure you're not being surprised. Say we entered a hothouse and are securing it: you cut a hole and enter the hothouse, shooting at the plant rows. You're not on automatic fire, but you do give a few bursts to make sure you won't be surprised.
You fired at the house too, and there was an innocent family inside. The battalion commander spoke about this before or after this happened, that such a situation might arise, or that you should avoid this in the future – shooting at a house that, rather than being empty, contained innocents?
I don't remember if he specifically addressed this, but in houses we approached later, with heavy APCs, first we went in and called out on loudspeakers without shooting at windows from the outside. At first no one came down, so we combed room after room until we detected some suspect movement. We yelled for people to get out – I wasn't there myself but it was my own company – they yelled again and then began to shoot inside the apartment building. That's how the battle actually started. So yes, there was a change. In the first houses we said "these are our objectives and we're firing at them." Then we shot at windows and the roof.
In the battalion commander's talk about the goals of this operation, did he not say there were civilians there who should be dealt with?
Sure he did. He said it's complicated, because the enemy was hiding behind civilian population. But he added that if we suspect someone, we should not give him the benefit of the doubt. Eventually this could be an enemy, even if it's some old woman approaching the house. It could be an old woman carrying an explosive charge.
Did you inquire how to verify this? That's what rules of engagement are for. Did anyone ask about this?
Rules of engagement are different here because no permission to shoot is necessary. You see something you suspect – you open fire because you don't want it to get away. That's why you have to make sure you don't hit just for the sake of hitting. He warned that we were going into a complex situation and if anything arouses our suspicion, we mustn't hesitate because the enemy hides among civilians. We must be more alert and if we detect with certainty that this will not jeopardize us, there's no sense in opening fire. On the other hand, if we have the slightest suspicion and are under time pressure – we should shoot. If not, we can report about it. We had constant reports about suspect women or pairs, stuff like that.
Meaning, if it doesn't jeopardize me and it's far away, I don't automatically open fire or aim to fire. There are two phases: there's the primary phase of taking objectives. There, whatever is suspect is targeted for fire, and there are houses on the road, like in an ambush. As soon as someone passes them – you shoot. The 'red line' procedure is to report, request permission to open fire.
Is there suspect-arrest procedure like demonstrative fire or calling out to whoever's there? I assume you didn't mark lines. It's the unit's private language.
Yes, it's a private code.
If someone approaches, how do you inform him? Do you have megaphones?
No. We don't. I don't know how you inform him. Before we entered, the air force threw flyers and people were supposed to get out of there. As for those who didn't get out, we were to shoot in the air or near their feet. But if someone would cross the red line, you were supposed to shoot him. Unless there's a special announcement, for there were humanitarian ceasefires all the time, when we were not shooting.
What was the distance between the house and such a red line?
100 meters. At light arms range. There are also snipers there with us in the house who sight further away and detect approaches.
How did people come out of that talk with the battalion commander?
I didn't feel that great, personally. This was because of the way he expressed himself about certain things. The general feeling was that we were entering this operation with zeal, people were preparing themselves and revving themselves up before going in, and then going ahead.
What did he say that troubled you?
"My best Arabic translator is my grenade launcher." I don't remember the context, just the gist of things.
People raised an eyebrow at this?
Some. But that's what troubled me most. One of the soldiers compared the ground units to a dog who's beaten up a lot. The dog gets all worked up and then it's directed at someone and ordered to 'go get him.' It's true. Infantry battalions eat a lot of shit in routine service, it's like this in any army. Youngsters are out for action and most of them have pretty racist views anyway, some of them say "I don't want wars, but what can we do, this is how things are and we'll never have peace with the Arabs." That's the general picture. On the other hand there are some people with leftist views, but they're the minority.
Everything is probably tagged as 'operational.'
Yes. I think that was the context of going in with so much force. We knew we were going in and that the surprise factor would be in our intense fire-power, destruction and as much damage as possible to terrorist infrastructure. It's like saying "We're sick and tired of your Qassam rockets." In this sense the best way to speak Arabic is through the grenade launcher, as if Arabs understand only force. I think that such things are said in heat before going to battle, to fire up soldiers. For when you go into such an operation, there are two possibilities: either you're terribly scared or terribly 'gung-ho.' Better 'gung-ho' than frightened, for this way you can do a better job of it.
Name: *** Rank: *** Unit: *** Place of incident: *** Description:
In general, we had quick combat procedure. Interestingly, 24 hours before the operation began, a general briefing was held about how long we were going in for. The battalion commander said he estimates about 3-4 weeks. You couldn't know for sure. This battalion commander is a good speaker, knows how to motivate us. One of the things that stood out was a subjective sense, something very permissive about the whole thing. He said we were going to exercise insane fire power with artillery and air force. We were given the feeling that we were not just being sent out there, but with enormous security and cover. He did restrain it and say, "It's not that you're out to carry out a massacre, but…" – this was the restraint to everything he had said before, and in between his own jokes which made me laugh, too. Like, "We have an Arabic-speaking grenade launcher, and a heavy machine-gun that speaks Arabic." This was the spirit of things.
Was anything said about rules of engagement?
My impression about rules of engagement was that, at least at our level, they were not clear. There were no clear red lines. In urban areas it's very much at the commanders' own discretion. As for the fire-power actually used, the feeling was of war against a regular army. On the one hand, we were told to enter every house under live fire. A grenade or two, shooting, and only then we enter. Things were said that in a way made us confident that our own lives were top priority.
Name: *** Rank: *** Unit: *** Place of incident: *** Description:
What are you told at the briefings before entering?
That's a complex question. In official, formal briefings, there was no talk about what we were about to do. We didn't know what we were going to do. Until the evening before our entry into the Gaza Strip, we didn't know what the action in our area would be like. But it's important to say that everyone who talked to us, whether our own brigade commander – who didn't take an integral part in the action, but joined because a battalion from his brigade did – or officers we somehow got to meet, all sounded extremely militant, used very fierce language.
What language was that?
Let's say that the general approach was 'we're going off to war' and I can swear I heard our brigade commander at least once, when sitting with us during maneuvers for a combatants talk around the campfire at Tze'elim at night – he happened to join us and we asked him what was going on in Gaza and what was to be expected, stuff like that, and he went so far as to say this was war and in war as in war, no consideration of civilians was to be taken. You shoot anyone you see. I'm paraphrasing here, not literally quoting, but the gist of the matter was very clear.
How did people take this?
Look, we're a pretty old company. We're a founding battalion, all of us are 33 years-old, and we took this very skeptically, a bit fearful of the army's approach. I know for myself, I don't know what every single guy that night felt about it. I know personally that this pretty much disgusted me. There was a clear feeling, and this was repeated whenever others spoke to us, that no humanitarian consideration played any role in the army at present. The goal was to carry out an operation with the least possible casualties for the army, without its even asking itself what the price would be for the other side. This was the bent of things that we heard from more than one officer.
What officers?
Can't tell you. Who spoke to us? Except for our own brigade commander – who's a regular officer – there were officers from that base. I don't remember who talked to us, I can't name their official title, I really don't remember.
In official talks this tone was repeated?
There weren't too many official talks. We were training most of the time. A part of the company perhaps did have official talks, but we didn't attend too many of those. In general, we were in maneuvers and couldn't get too many details about our unit's activity. So we didn't talk to any intelligence NCO or senior officer, at least not our company, except for officers from our own battalion: our own battalion commander, our own brigade commander. Beyond that, we didn't run into too many senior officers. When our brigade commander spoke, the tone was very obvious.
You mentioned you had a talk with the brigade commander.
Yes. Improvised.
Where was this?
At Tze'elim (training base).
You were conducting maneuvers on how it was all going to look inside (the Strip)?
Yes. Getting used to the appearance of a protective secondary position. The tanks are stationed there after practice, it's night, the tanks are parked around the position and we organize our tent where we eat, and tank maneuvers – that's the operation staff. The rest all wait. So we happened to sit there around a campfire and the brigade commander joined us. He described to us exactly what was taking place in Gaza. Precisely.
What?
He described the incidents of friendly fire. I think this was a day after a tank fired at a Golani battalion commander. I don't recall the exact details. He explained what happened, why it happened, how it happened. He told us about some more incidents in the area, about an attempted abduction of a Golani (infantry) soldier and how he got out of that. He told us stories from the area and then questions came up on what we'd be doing there and what everyday life will be like. He said, "You will stay inside the tanks the whole time." We talked about practical matters, but the basic approach to war was very brutal, that was my impression. Perhaps others felt differently. He said something along the lines of "Don't let morality become an issue. That will come up later." He had this strange language: "Leave the nightmares and horrors that will come up for later, now just shoot." This was the spirit of things, more or less. Then we were in this city built up for practice in Tze'elim, we maneuvered there a bit and patrolled inside, where tanks cannot enter. There was an officer with us, can't tell you what his duty was, who talked to us about lessons learned and conclusions drawn from the fighting in Gaza. That was being done the whole time, there were booklets coming out on this constantly. I don't know what was in them.
In this war?
During the first days of the campaign. It kept coming all the time. Whole booklets on lessons learned in the war on Gaza, and they were being constantly updated. So he (brigade commander) took us for a patrol to see what urban combat would look like in a tank, and there too, the basic approach, the lesson he tried to get across to us, was that there were no chances taken. If you face an area that is hidden by a building – you take down the building. Questions such as "who lives in that building" are not asked. Whatever gets in your way, you do everything to prevent its getting in your way, regardless of the humanitarian implications of such an action. This was the spirit of things with anyone we happened to talk to. Let's say that the issue of 'purity of arms' did not come up at all in these talks.
